Jairam Ramesh on how he earned the nickname “Dr No”

The toughest challenge I faced during my tenure was on the "go–no-go" issue — it placed me right in the crosshairs of the environment versus development debate. If putting a halt to or questioning few projects on their record of adhering to environmental norms earned me the moniker of "Dr No", then the "go–no-go" imbroglio cemented it. It wasn’t just the criticism that made it tough for me. It was also an instance when I had to balance my commitment to growth and the environment, in a manner that both sides won or were left equally dissatisfied.

On the one hand was my understanding that India needed to grow and it needed energy, which came primarily from coal, and on the other was the understanding that India needed to protect its forests and be more sustainable in its natural resource management. It was one of those "practice what you preach" moments.

Though, both I personally and the ministry were targeted as obstacles to growth, the irony was that the suggestion to clearly demarcate forest areas where mining would not be allowed came from the then chairman of Coal India Limited (CIL). Perhaps, what was even more of an irony was that the announcement that no clearance proposals would be entertained in areas demarcated as "no-go" and that CIL would not submit any proposals for the "no-go" areas was made jointly by then minister for coal Shriprakash Jaiswal and I. This was agreed on as part of the six-point agenda prepared by the environment and coal ministries to expedite the forest and environment clearances for coal mining projects, while keeping environmental interests in mind. The ministries of coal and environment, along with CIL, agreed to work jointly on an exercise to map coal reserves and forest cover across nine major coal fields — Singrauli, IB Valley, Mand Raigarh, Sohagpur, Talcher, Vardha Valley, Hasdeo–Arand, North Karanpura, and West Bokaro — to determine areas where mining could be permitted.

Shortage

However, once the exercise was completed, the coal ministry backed out, perhaps, as the areas that would remain closed to mining activity were far more than it had anticipated. For CIL, which was facing a shortfall in production, this became an opportunity to lay the blame for not meeting targets at a doorstep other than its own. The "go–no-go" formulation became the cause of the coal shortage. I was at the receiving end of criticism from the ministers holding infrastructure portfolios.

Having successfully blamed the environment ministry for "endangering growth", the coal ministry attempted to ride the public opinion, and even the opinion of many in government, to gain access to larger swathes of forest areas. In late December 2010, the coal ministry moved a Cabinet note, which would make it almost mandatory for the environment ministry to divert forest land for each coal block allotted by the coal ministry without taking into account the effects of such diversion on environment, forests, and wildlife. Not only would acceding to such a demand be in contravention of the laws and the Supreme Court, it would also mean having to say "yes" to every project and proposal across the board. A situation that would render the environmental legal regime meaningless. Faced with this demand, I wrote to the PM spelling out the manner in which the coal ministry was passing the blame and how unfettered access would discourage investment in development and adoption of new technology for coal extraction.

With no compromise in sight, the matter was referred to a 12-member Group of Ministers (GoM) headed by the then finance minister, Pranab Mukherjee — whose task it was to find a solution to this imbroglio. As the stand-off continued, I offered the GoM a compromise — the environment ministry would take the decision on each case, taking into account recommendations from the statutory Forest Advisory Committee (FAC). The decisions would be presented to the GoM, which could overrule or support my decision. To some, the compromise was akin to a Faustian bargain but my offer was an effort to maintain the integrity of the forest clearance process and the FAC while giving the Cabinet the option to reconsider decisions in the context of the country’s larger energy picture.

I took a decision on four projects in the "no-go" areas. Of these, two were given clearance, in one case, the project developer realised it was better to opt for a mine in a "go" area and for one project, I denied the clearance, a decision that was later overturned by the GoM.

Scapegoat

The "go–no-go" debate made it clear that the environmental concerns were still not central to economic decisions. Worse, the concern for ecological security was being used as convenient excuse to not address other issues. The coal saga once again provides a good illustration of this trend. The coal ministry blamed the "go–no-go" classification and the comprehensive environmental pollution index for lower production. However, there was no discussion on other factors that were responsible for CIL failing to meet its production targets, something that was a regular condition. I did try to raise the issue of CIL’s production practices; for example, the coal mining major has 200,000 ha of land (including 55,000 ha of forest area) in its possession, but only 25 per cent of the area had been worked upon, or that it often mined below permissible production limits. Both issues beg the same question: Why did it need access to more forest areas for mining?

My quest was to make environmental concerns central to growth strategies but it now was beginning to look like ecological security had become the convenient scapegoat for all other failings.

Reprinted with the publisher’s permission.