Murder of Lt Ummer Fayaz: How Modi government can crush Kashmir unrest
Kashmir has been in the limelight since the holding of by-polls, when incidents of stone-throwing and attacks on police and CRPF increased. It made front page headlines when a local was tied in front of an army vehicle, as part of a rescue mission. It has been the focus of discussion in every form of media.
Controversial politicians in the form of Farooq Abdullah continue to vent venom against the government and security agencies, but as usual all he gains is more hatred, with almost no sympathy, even in Kashmir where the locals mark him and his family as the architects of failure.
He regularly bellows the only line he knows - talk with the Hurriyat and Pakistan, sounding more like a Pakistani parrot, while in his heart he knows that this is the opposite of what should actually be done.
The recent abduction and brutal assassination of young Army officer Lt Ummer Fayaz shocked the nation. The officer was on leave; hence information of his presence would only have been conveyed by his local friends. He was attending a marriage and was in the presence of the bride when he was abducted.
No one even reported his abduction, nor recovered the body when it was dumped, post being riddled with bullets, leaving his father and relatives to carry it to the hospital. It signalled the end of Kashmiriyat and Insaniyat in the Valley.
The Hurriyat mentions talks, but is unwilling to budge from its stand. It has also commenced passing contrary statements, basically because it has no locus-standi left. Their latest call to locals to shun Army schools, while educating their own children in safe cities, is a joke; however, there is no one in the Valley to project this paradox to the masses.
The present situation is beyond the Hurriyat's control. To safeguard its own importance and seeking to continue to enjoy state privileges, it recently resorted to announcing that the agitation is not linked to ISIS or al-Qaeda, as if anyone believes them anymore. Even if did attempt to call a halt to terror activities and stone-throwing, nobody would listen.
It is only a conduit for flow of funds. Money from Pakistan is channelled through various sources into the hands of the Hurriyat, from where it flows to districts, to support the only prevailing industry of the state - stone-throwing and violence. Hence, the Hurriyat per se is as worthless as demonetised notes.
The current agitation is now spearheaded by Pakistan-sponsored local youth leaders, with funds to incite and buy violence, co-supported by anti-India Imams spitting venom against non-Muslims from the minar of the mosque, giving the movement a religious flavour.
Videos are galore of small children chanting slogans of "go India, go back", most too young to be even aware of what it means, having learnt the words in local madrasas. College and school children before participating in stone-pelting, dance a standard ritual, singing and shouting "azadi, azadi", with most confused about what they mean by it.
Is it azadi as a separate state, azadi to join Pakistan, azadi to become a caliphate or azadi with greater autonomy, no one seems to be aware. It cannot be a separate state, as the Jammu and Kashmir flag has never been flown, only Pakistani and ISIS flags have. The Hurriyat is equally confused and states that things would be decided by the people, failing to mention whether the "people" referred to are from Jammu and Kashmir or just from the five affected districts of the state.
The generation participating in the violence has been born during militancy, having seen soldiers, guns, house searches, road blocks and violence since birth. Hence they fear the Army less. Further, having been born post the ethnic cleansing of Kashmiri Pandits, they have never seen any other religion in the region and thus consider Kashmir as an Islamic state, subjugated by India.
This is reinforced by the easy availability of religious channels from Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, spouting hate against other religions and sects, further igniting the fire. They seem to be getting carried away by the ISIS ideology of paradise after death.
Supporters of the agitation from the Valley, in television debates, talk of fear within the region of being engulfed by a Hindu India, led by the present government. In discussions, they compare stone-throwers to gau rakshaks, stating that if gau rakshaks are justified in protecting their religion, so are Kashmiris in seeking azadi, again unclear about what it implies.
The nature of militancy has also changed in the region. In the initial phases of militancy, locals were equal targets along with security forces. They were harassed and forced to provide succour and support to militants, hence information flowed. The present is witness to a different phase.
Open support by locals to trapped militants, especially during encounters, enabling their escape, instigation of the public by locally recruited militants (which has seen an increase) and merger of militant groups under the United Jihad Council (UJC) has changed the relationship between locals and militants.
This change in relationship has resulted in only security forces, including the police, being targets. Recent videos showing suspected informers being tortured by militants would impact further flow of information.
While the agitation is confined to limited districts, with only a limited population (mainly youth), attacks on security forces and open support to militants infiltrating from across the border have made it national headlines.
There is also a fear of migration of population from the Valley to presently peaceful areas of the state, mainly south of Pir Panjal and Jammu. This could in the long term be disastrous as it could alter the existing demography, increase the divide and enhance security problems, if not checked.
The agitation is also being impacted by growing tensions along the Line of Control (LoC) between India and Pakistan. The recent border incident in Poonch and increased attempts at infiltration, supported by enhanced firing, have only engulfed the Kashmir problem.
While forces employed for both tasks are different, there is a realisation that till Kashmir continues to simmer, the border would remain hyper-active, as Pakistan would continue to ferment trouble and increase pressure. If the tempo in Kashmir is reduced, the border would simultaneously be controlled.
In this melee, there have been a variety of suggestions, with almost everyone and anyone projecting his perception of the options available to the government in resolving the crises. While the majority seeks hard and strong action with application of maximum force, a few speak of continuing with a soft approach.
Most Indians opine that Article 370, which is the cause of the problem, should be abrogated and the state bifurcated into three parts, with Jammu and Kashmir being states and Ladakh a Union Territory directly under the Centre.
Further, Kashmir could then be placed under Governor’s Rule and handled with a firm hand. Those still advocating a softer line suggest talks with stakeholders. Some include the defunct Hurriyat as a stakeholder, which others refer to political parties and student leaders.
No government can ever consider or even accept secession or an uprising, irrespective of criticism. It would have to resort to every means to prevent it, its internal debate being to apply force when the situation demands, not when options still exist.
The major dilemma facing the government is whether its boundaries of tolerance have been breached or alternatives can still be considered.
Any hard approach, implying application of force, as a means of last resort is exactly what Pakistan desires, since it seeks to project a high-handed Indian government at the Centre. It has no love for the locals, but incites them only to seek international support.
For India, it is simple. A decision once taken should be implemented irrespective of international or internal comments or criticism. Pro-Pakistan supporters and opposition politicians with no scruples would blame the government and further incite and alienate the population, even in areas which are still relatively calm.
Thus, when considering a hard approach, the government must have in place soft measures to placate the population, alongside application of force.
Any avenue being considered by the government should include a few steps. Firstly, it should move the leadership of the Hurriyat away from the region, thus cutting off the Valley’s means of illegal funds, irrespective of local backlash.
Secondly, it should isolate the affected districts from the rest of the state, which has remained calm and unaffected by the agitation. This could imply involving larger forces spread across districts to dominate the region, pushing militants away from populated areas. Simultaneously, arrest those who instigate, while forcing students away from the streets, employing force, if necessary.
While Kashmir is being brought to normalcy, enhancing the anti-infiltration grid is important. By controlling infiltration, the Army would be able to reduce further induction into the region, though anti-infiltration measures can never be a zero-sum game.
In the ultimate analysis, the government must act, bringing this phase of agitation to a close.
At the end of the day, irrespective of the model applied, the final scenario would be a secure border, with Pakistan at bay, a disgruntled population in some districts of the state, confused about their status, unhappy and unwilling to accept their present, but in no position to change their future.
They would continue to lament quietly, seek support of arm-chair activists and anti-government press, however they would know that they will remain a part of India. The cost of curbing the agitation would be high in casualties, international reputation and standing, the end result - enforced peace. This is when a serious healing touch is essential.
Would the government be willing to accept this risk? Does the situation warrant it or is the government still willing to try softer approaches? Is the latest assassination of Lt Ummer Fayaz the turning point? The answer may flow shortly.