How India is moving closer to the European Union
The European Commission’s president, Jean-Claude Juncker, believes that the EU and India are natural partners. Apart from the bonds of democracy and shared beliefs and values, for him, this natural partnership is based also on the combat against climate change, terrorism, and cooperation on cyber security and digital technologies.
The EU, he notes, is India’s largest trade partner, with trade in goods and services exceeding $100 billion (Rs 65,356 crore) and India hosting around 6,000 European companies. Even with Brexit in 2019, the EU, he thinks, will remain India’s biggest trading partner.
For the European Council president Donald Tusk, the EU’s ultimate goal is to have a strong strategic partnership by enhancing geo-strategic relations and economic cooperation, with climate change, counter-terrorism and urbanisation being focal points of interest.
Partnership
In conceptual terms, the India-EU natural partnership could transcend rhetoric. India’s steady economic rise and its increasing contribution to global growth in the years ahead make it an obvious partner for the EU in its capacity as one of the world’s largest trading groups and the second largest economy.
With Asia’s rise and shifts in global economic power eastwards, the EU has perforce to pay more attention to Asia and, within Asia, it has to assess, looking ahead, the values, international outlook, attitude to disputes, adherence to international law, national plans and ambitions of which country are compatible with Europe’s perspectives and interests.
In the changing international scenario, the India-EU engagement is certainly growing and this is reflected in the 53 paragraphs (compared to 41 at the 13th summit in 2016) of the 2017 joint statement. Some gains for India are evident, and some nuances that beg some questions.
As against the 2016 separate India-EU statement on counter-terrorism, this year’s separate statement lists additional terror attacks against India since March 2016 and specifically mentions “globally proscribed terrorists and terror entities, including Hafeez Saeed, Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi, Dawood Ibrahim, LeT, JeM, Hizb-ul-Mujahideen” and so on. This is a plus, but unlike in the case with US, Spain, and Japan, “cross-border terrorism” is excluded.
On connectivity issues, with China’s Belt and Road Initiative in mind, a plus was achieved with India and the EU underlining that connectivity issues must be based on “universally recognised international norms, good governance, rule of law, openness, transparency and equality and must follow principles of financial responsibility, accountable debt financing practices, balanced ecological and environmental protection, preservation standards and social sustainability”.
We failed, however, to get the EU to include a reference to respect for sovereignty in connectivity initiatives. Showing heightened EU concern about China’s policies, this time the joint statement refers to the South China Sea issues — albeit indirectly — by underlining the “importance of freedom of navigation, overflight and peaceful resolution of disputes, in accordance with the universally recognised principles of International Law, notably the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 1982.”
Threat
On Afghanistan the terrorist threat to it is more robustly worded than in 2016, and unlike then, the EU has appreciated the positive role being played by India in “extending development assistance in Afghanistan, including for building social and economic infrastructure, governance institutions and human resource development and capacity building”, which rebuffs Pakistan’s position on India’s zero role in Afghanistan. The EU has “noted” India’s intensified engagement with the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG), the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Australia Group, but curiously does not use the word “support”, which is puzzling.
In the context of US threats to undo the Iranian nuclear deal, India and the EU reaffirmed their support for it as “a crucial contribution to the non-proliferation framework and international peace, stability and security”. On the North Korean nuclear tests, India and the EU, following the lead given by India and Japan, “stressed the responsibility of those who support DPRK’s nuclear and missile programmes”, which is an allusion to China and Pakistan.
On Myanmar, those fleeing from the Rakhine state are not classified as refugees, and both sides have taken note “that this violence was triggered off by a series of attacks by Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) militants which led to loss of lives amongst the security forces as well as the civilian population”. Given the widespread disillusionment in the West with Aung San Suu Kyi, this is remarkable.
Issues
On economic issues, no tangible progress was registered on the EU-India Broad-based Trade and Investment Agreement (BTIA) negotiations, with the two sides noting “the ongoing efforts on both sides to re-engage actively towards timely launching negotiations for the BTIA”, which does not suggest any breakthrough.
Both sides agreed to enhanced cooperation in the field of Intellectual Property rights (IPR) and public procurement, the two subjects that the EU wants to be included in BTIA negotiations. Cyber security has figured prominently on the agenda. On the sensitive issue of trade in agricultural products in general, and rice in particular, the intention is to work together “to resolve issues that have the potential of disrupting trade”.
Intensifying cooperation in skills development and finding complementarities between India’s Skill India initiative and the EU’s new skills agenda for Europe find mention. Strengthening cooperation on higher education, including through India’s GIAN programme and the EU’s Erasmus+ programme, has been flagged. A joint statement on clean energy and climate change has been adopted. All in all, progress has been registered.
(Courtesy of Mail Today.)