Modi government's Pakistan policy deserves credit
Former foreign minister Natwar Singh once famously said: Pakistan's foreign policy is simple: when in doubt, blame India, when not in doubt, blame India. Apart from being a good sound byte, this statement also provides good food for thought about our own foreign policy.
Pakistan's approach to foreign policy is undoubtedly India-centric and there is nothing wrong in it per se. They perceive India as posing an existential threat to them, particulary after what we did to them in 1971, albeit because of their own blunders. Our assurances to them to the contrary either have not convinced Pakistan about our good faith or it does not suit them to accept them because of their agenda.
We have maintained that our foreign policy has a broader agenda, since we view ourselves as playing a big role on world stage in all areas of human activity. We are supposed not to be obsessed about Pakistan. This is only partially true. Every time some country decides to sell arms to Pakistan, we protest.
We seem to believe that if Russia sells arms to Pakistan, it implies diminution of Russian support to us or dilution of their friendship for us. America has been supplying advanced weaponry to Pakistan for decades; we have been protesting without any effect. Thus, our protests turn out to be pro-forma and only make us look diffident.
Furthermore, such reactions, apart from not achieving their purpose, suggest that Pakistan looms pretty large in our foreign policy. This too is understandable since Pakistan has waged four wars against us. But since we do not regard Pakistan as posing an existential threat to us, we do need to reflect whether we should express concern every time another country offers something to Pakistan.
The "strategic" community in Delhi often debates whether we have a Pakistan policy and if yes, what it is. We do have a foreign policy which is the same as every other country has, viz, protect and promote national interests. To lend profundity, this policy is sometimes labeled "strategic autonomy", which in essence is nothing more and somewhat less than an independent policy.
The criticism most often heard about the approach to Pakistan is summarised by the phrase "flip flop". It means that our policy is not consistent; we do not stand by our pronouncements, we send confusing signals to Pakistan as well as to our own people. This criticism fails the test of national interest.
Consistency is not necessarily a virtue in international affairs. Consistency in protecting national interest, yes but not in statements or negotiating positions. This is particularly true while dealing with Pakistan. Government must keep flexibility in approach, tailoring its pronouncements to suit the requirements as the occasion demands.
It is true that if one day the government says "no talks until the terrorists are brought to justice" and the next day holds talks at whatever level, it would create a negative perception of the government among the people. But that is a political issue for the government; as far as practice of foreign policy is concerned, the contradiction is not a cause for concern. Foreign relations are not a game of bridge where you are expected to declare your conventions to the opponents and where the opponents have the right to demand explanation of your bidding.
We are not required to clarify our intentions to our opponents in foreign relations. This is particularly true of Pakistan since it has a civilian government which has no control over the military. It is the latter that calls all the shots, especially on relations with India and Afghanistan.
India can never be sure whether what Islamabad says or suggests is backed by Rawalpindi. We are repeatedly asked to believe that both the military and the government are on the same page in their India policy, but for the most part, we remain unconvinced and for good reasons.
We too make threatening statements that we ought to know cannot be implemented, and that erode government's credibility since we do not act on the threats. The narrative that terror attacks are carried out to sabotage the "peace process" suits both countries. For Pakistan, it dilutes or diverts the attention that the terrorist acts demand of Pakistan authorities in terms of cracking down on the terrorist networks, etc. For India, the narrative provides a useful pretext for not retaliating robustly, since in any case we are not in a position to do so.
On the whole, the government has handled relations with Pakistan quite pragmatically. In the absence of any feasible alternative, such as military action or economic sanctions, the only choice is between talking and not talking. Not talking causes no harm to Pakistan, but eventually invites diplomatic pressure on us.
As for prime minsiter Narendra Modi's visit to Lahore, it has done no damage. Indeed, it has starkly brought out the limitations on Nawaz Sharif's ability to act on India policy, assuming that he is genuine in his assertions of friendly sentiments, as many Pakistan experts seem to believe. (We ought not to forget that Sharif was aware of the Kargil misadventure before it happened. And were not the Sharif brothers known in the past for their links with extremist groups?)