India-US defence: Taking ties to a new level
The India-US strategic partnership has been described as India’s “principal” strategic partnership. US President Barack Obama’s forthcoming visit as the chief guest on Republic Day is likely to give a fresh impetus to this relationship. While the relationship is substantive and broad based, the impressive achievements of the strategic partnership are to a large extent attributable to the successful implementation of the ten-year Defence Framework Agreement signed in June 2005. The renewal of this agreement will be a major item on the bilateral agenda during the summit meeting. The aim should be to take defence cooperation between the two countries to the next higher trajectory.
Defence Framework Agreement
Defence Cooperation has many dimensions. These include senior officers’ visits and military exchanges; joint military exercises; the sale, purchase and joint development of weapons and defence equipment; the transfer of military technology; intelligence sharing; cooperation for counter-terrorism and counter-proliferation; joint patrolling of the sea lanes of communication against piracy and terrorism; jointly providing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief after natural calamities; and, coordination in transnational anti-drug trafficking activities. India and the US have participated extensively in all of these activities since the path-breaking Defence Framework Agreement was signed.
Under the Defence Framework Agreement, India and the US had agreed to conduct joint and combined exercises and exchanges; collaborate in multinational operations if it is in common interest; strengthen capabilities of militaries to promote security and defeat terrorism; promote regional and global peace and stability; enhance capabilities to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; increase opportunities for technology transfer, collaboration, co-production, and research and development; expand collaboration relating to missile defence; strengthen abilities of the armed forces to respond quickly to disasters, including in combined operations; conduct successful peacekeeping operations; and, increase exchanges of intelligence. The agreed institutionalised framework for cooperation under this agreement included the bilateral mechanism of the Defence Policy Group and under it the Defence Procurement and Production Group and the Defence Joint Working Group.
Recent summit meetings have resulted in further fleshing out the scope of defence cooperation. During the Obama-Manmohan Singh summit meeting in September 2013, the two leaders called for “expanding security cooperation between the United States and India to address 21st century challenges.” They endorsed a Joint Declaration on Defence Cooperation “as a means of enhancing their partnership in defence technology transfer, joint research, co-development and co-production.” President Obama appreciated India’s decision to participate in the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) naval exercise that was hosted by the US Pacific Command in 2014.
During the Obama-Narendra Modi meeting in September 2014, the two leaders stated their intention to expand defence cooperation to bolster national, regional, and global security. It was agreed that the two countries would build an enduring partnership in which both sides treat each other at the same level as their closest partners, including defence technology transfers, trade, research, co-production and co-development.
Prime Minister Modi and President Obama welcomed the first meeting under the framework of the Defence Trade and Technology Initiative in September 2014. They endorsed its decision to establish a task force to expeditiously evaluate and decide on unique projects and technologies which would have a transformative impact on bilateral defence relations and enhance India's defence industry and military capabilities. They welcomed cooperation in the area of military education, joint training and exercises, cooperation in maritime security to ensure freedom of navigation and unimpeded movement of lawful shipping and commercial activity and decided to upgrade the scope of the annual joint naval exercise Malabar.
The two leaders reaffirmed their deep concern over the continued threat posed by terrorism, most recently highlighted by the dangers presented by the Islamic State, and agreed to make joint efforts to dismantle safe havens for terrorist and criminal networks and to disrupt all financial and tactical support for networks such as Al Qaeda, Lashkar-e Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammad, the D-Company and the Haqqanis. They asked Pakistan to bring the perpetrators of the November 2008 terrorist attack in Mumbai to justice.
Defence Trade and Technology Initiative: Breaking new ground
The most notable achievements of recent summit meetings have been the enhanced cooperation in the field of defence trade and technology. For several decades, India’s procurement of weapons platforms and other defence equipment had remained mired in disadvantageous buyer-seller, patron-client relationships like that with the erstwhile Soviet Union and Russia. While India has been manufacturing Russian fighter aircraft and tanks under license, the Russians never actually transferred weapons technology to India.
The country has now diversified its acquisition sources beyond Russia to Western countries and Israel. From the US, India has purchased weapons platforms and other items of defence equipment worth around USD 10 billion over the last five years. Major procurements have included the troop carrier ship INS Jalashva (USS Trenton), six C-130J Super Hercules aircraft for India’s Special Forces, ten C-17 Globemaster heavy lift transport aircraft, 12 Boeing P-8I Poseidon long-range maritime reconnaissance aircraft and 12 AN-TPQ37 Weapon Locating Radars. Another six C-130J and seven C-17 aircraft are expected to be purchased over the next few years. Also in the acquisition pipeline are M-777 light artillery howitzers for the mountains, Apache attack helicopters and Chinook medium lift transport helicopters.
However, none of the recent deals with the US have included transfer-of-technology (ToT) clauses. There is now a growing realisation in India that future defence acquisitions must simultaneously lead to a transformative change in the country’s defence technology base and manufacturing prowess. Hence, it is imperative that whatever India procures now must be procured with a ToT clause being built into the contract even though it means having to pay a higher price. The aim should be to make India a design, development, manufacturing and export hub for defence equipment in two to three decades.
In September 2013, deputy secretary of Defence Ashton Carter, soon to be appointed US Defence Secretary, offered India a “Defence Trade and Technology Initiative (DTTI)” under which the US will share sensitive cutting edge defence technology and permit US companies to enter into joint production and co-development ventures with India. The US offered a list of ten joint production projects to India. According to Carter, "These include a maritime helo, a naval gun, a surface-to-air missile system, and a scatterable anti-tank system.” He said, "We changed our mind-set around technology transfer to India in the Department of Defence from a culture of presumptive no to one of presumptive yes."
The next generation Javelin anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) is another key candidate for joint production, though so far the US has been hesitant to offer its seeker and warhead technology and the MoD has decided to acquire Israel’s Spike missile for the time being. India is also looking for high-end counter-IED technologies. In future, the two countries will conduct joint research and development for new weapons systems and the US may even offer nuclear power packs for submarines and aircraft carriers and fighter aircraft engines. Cooperation of such a high order will raise India’s technology base by an order of magnitude and help the country to move several notches higher in its quest for self-reliance in defence production.
Contours of future cooperation
Before stepping down as Secretary of Defence, Chuck Hagel had nominated Frank Kendall, the Department’s Undersecretary for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, as the DTTI’s American lead. With Ashton Carter becoming Secretary of Defence, the initiative will get a fresh boost. The extended Defence Framework Agreement should take stock of the goals of the 2005 agreement that have not been fully achieved and should profess a renewed commitment to achieving these.
The foremost in this category is the transfer of weapons technology. The US knows by now that nothing matters more than this to India. There has been no progress in cooperation on BMD technology. This needs to be rectified. Intelligence sharing is limited to ongoing counter-terrorism operations at present. It should be extended to the sharing of databases as well, particularly the terrorism database maintained by the US NCTC and India’s NATGRID.
Prime Minister Modi’s government has raised the FDI limit for defence joint ventures (JVs) from 26 to 49 per cent equity participation. It is likely to be open to modifying the offsets policy, which is considered a stumbling block. The agreement should take into account the Indian PM’s exhortation to industry to “make in India”. The two governments should act as facilitators for their public and private sector companies to form JVs for the joint design and development and co-production of future weapons platforms. The export laws should be suitably amended so that weapons and equipment can be exported to achieve economies of scale.
Discussions for the new Defence Framework Agreement should explore ways to incorporate military officers from both sides into the high-level Defense Policy Group and the annual Strategic Dialogue; formalise information sharing; bring leaders from the US Pacific Command and Indian regional commands into bilateral defence discussions; and, develop a framework for prioritising bilateral and multilateral exercise engagements. Bilateral exchanges on defence strategy and defence transformation should also be extended to young parliamentarians and scholars in strategic and security studies think tanks.
There is mutual recognition of the adverse implications of China’s increasing assertiveness and the need to work in unison with the international community to uphold the unfettered use of the global commons like the sea lanes of communication, space and cyberspace. China’s recent belligerence in the South China Sea and its assertiveness in dealing with the dispute over the Senkaku (Diaoyu) islands with Japan have undermined international and regional confidence in its desire to resolve disputes peacefully. India is building robust military intervention capabilities and the armed forces are engaged in the process of formulating a doctrine to give effect to these capabilities.
Though India values its strategic autonomy and recognises that each bilateral relationship is important in its own way, the policy makers realise that the geo-political contours of the 21st century and peace and stability, particularly in the Indo-Pacific, will be shaped through cooperative security. In future, India may conduct joint military operations with the US in its area of strategic interest in a contingency in which India’s vital national interests are threatened. Though India would prefer to join intervention operations under Chapter 7 of the UN flag, it may be open to joining a “coalition of the willing” to safeguard its vital national interests.