Wrong to say Kashmir crisis is going back to 1990s
The rising violence in the Valley is witnessing extensive media attention. Visual media discusses the same things regularly and increases coverage whenever an adverse incident occurs. Strategic writers have been suggesting various measures to the government to resolve the issue, with many claiming that the situation is alarming.
There have been repeated statements by opposition parties that Governor’s rule be enforced in Jammu and Kashmir as the present coalition has failed the people. Some have gone to the extent of stating that the situation is back to the 1990s, where Kashmir was engulfed with violence, levels of which were subsequently brought down.
The above may appear so, but is far from the truth. A recent press release, covering the visit of the home secretary to the Valley and recent comments by a senior army officer controlling operations in south Kashmir, gives a different picture. The press release stated that only students of a few schools and colleges had resorted to stone-throwing, while the rest of the institutions functioned normally.
The senior army officer, responsible for south Kashmir, in an interaction with the media, agreed with the press release and stated that about a hundred militants are active in the region, an assessment which appears logical.
A glance at the ADGPI Indian Army (Additional Directorate General of Public Information) Facebook page and Twitter handle would illustrate that events conducted by the Army in rural areas have witnessed overwhelming attendance without any cries for azadi or stone-throwing. The enthusiasm shown by participants in inter-village sports events, including women's soccer, T-20 cricket tournaments and even a youth festival akin to any college festival anywhere else, present a different picture.
The press has much presence in cities, but limited in rural areas, which is logical, as connectivity remains an issue. Hence, most reports emanate from cities, where the youth is exploited on religious grounds.
To understand the prevailing scenario, we first need to comprehend the mind of the youth. Lack of employment opportunities, proved by increased participation in recruitment rallies, indicate a desperation for employment. In this state, any income is well-appreciated. Hence, the only industries, which pay regularly and timely are those of stone-throwing and violence.
Finance from Pakistan, routed through the Hurriyat, enables promotion of this industry, as has been illustrated in the recent sting operation. Further, the youth are bolder, more confident, having witnessed gun culture, violence, firing, road blocks and cordon and search operations (CASO) from their childhood. They have lesser fear of the Army.
More importantly, the Kashmiri youth have witnessed calls to prayer of only one religion, Islam, with the ethnic cleansing of Kashmiri Pundits and destruction of Hindu temples, prior to their birth. Hence, with a pro-Hindutva party in an alliance in the state's coalition government, there is a latent fear of re-induction of Kashmiri Pundits and army colonies, which are being projected as changing of demography.
The fact that the Pundits are the original residents of the area is being miscommunicated is also the truth behind army colonies, meant only for those who belong to the region and are in military service.
Hence, many pro-Kashmiri speakers on TV compare stone-throwers to gau rakshaks. Being pro-religion is expected, especially when channels broadcasting hatred of other sects and religion, broadcasted from Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, are easily available.
Further, rumours about atrocities and calls for Jihad are gaining ground. The spread of ISIS thought process, also influences the youth, making them believe that this is the future — after all, Muslims from almost all nations are participating in the battle in Syria and Iraq, for the establishment of the Caliphate.
The period of the early 1990s was different. There was no border fencing and the deployment of the Army internally was miniscule. The massacre of Kashmiri Pundits has changed the demography forever in the Valley. Militancy when it commenced was not considered a serious enough threat initially. Hence, spread rapidly.
It engulfed not only the Valley, where it remains till date, but also impacted the region south of the Pir Panjal, adversely affecting the districts of Rajouri, Poonch, Mendhar and Doda. In fact, incidents occurred even as far south as Jammu.
While the national leadership mulled its options, the Army increased its deployment steadily, inducting units from reserve formations for limited tenures in the region. This was not a satisfactory arrangement as the units had short tenures of six months, failed to build intelligence and lacked continuity. Then came the raising of the counter-insurgency forces for north and south Kashmir, Rajouri and Doda sectors.
This was simultaneous to the construction of the border fencing. Steadily and with determination, the militancy was brought under control, with the Army employing hard measures, which did impact relations with locals, but were needed at that time and were effective. Presently, militancy is almost non-existent south of Pir Panjal, while steadily rising in the Valley.
In the initial phases, the local Kashmiri was equally a target of militants as were security forces. Those living in remote areas were forced to provide succour to the militants, compelling them to support anti-militancy operations. The impact is visible even today, as elders are not involved in stone-throwing nor in agitations. They are more at peace with the deployed Army, than the youth. They have seen worse times and have realised that the Army was neither an enemy then, nor is now.
The elders have been able to control the youth in remote villages and hamlets. Hence, there is active participation in Army-conducted events in remote areas.
Disturbances remain in limited pockets and cities, where the youth have been turned by propaganda and calls for Jihad from the minbars of mosques. The youth have been influenced by "icons" such as Burhan Wani and his successor, Zakir Bhat, fuelled by money flowing for violence-supported activities. The late Lt Umar Fayaz is also emerging as an icon, for those away from the cities, as he was successful despite originating from a humble background.
Hence, the government needs to alter its strategy to handle this changing scenario. It needs to contain the situation in cities with a larger deployment of police forces, even enhancing application of force if it must. The Army needs to move militants from safe sanctuaries in cities to remote forests or rural areas, employing CASO, where they can be eliminated in grounds of own choosing. It simultaneously needs to prevent the spread of propaganda to remote regions, which are largely unaffected.
Areas south of Pir Panjal need greater emphasis and attention. Attempts for re-rise of militancy must be ruthlessly curbed. Government agencies need to be extra vigilant to ensure that demography in this region is not impacted in anyway. Hence, ensuring safety of minorities. Migration of population from north to south of Pir Panjal need to be monitored and discouraged. Simultaneously, enhancing counter-infiltration measures would restrict induction of fresh militants.
In the overall context, the situation is still way below the 1990s-level. It would need deft and coordinated actions by all agencies working in tandem, to control it at its present levels, before it begins a downward slide. The press, which seeks to generate media hype on Kashmir, needs to visit the interiors, attend army conducted events and present a true picture, enabling the common Indians to realise that the situation is controllable, and not as threatening as made out to be by opposition politicians, anti-India baiters like Arundhati Roy, the Hurriyat and their supporters, solely seeking to score brownie points.