Why China has changed the rules of the game at Doklam
The stand-off between India and China on the Doklam plateau is the longest border incident since the Sumdurong Chu crisis in 1987. The June 16 face-off, it is clear, is already markedly different from previous boundary disputes.
The 2013 face-off at Depsang, where the PLA pitched a tent on disputed territory, and the 2014 stand-off in Chumar were resolved diplomatically through on-the-ground flag meetings and through the foreign ministries in Delhi and Beijing, with quiet diplomacy enabling a simultaneous withdrawal. India and China also have a working mechanism for consultation and coordination on border affairs, that has helped keep the channels open to address issues on the boundary.
But for the first time, China is demanding an unconditional Indian withdrawal as a precondition for diplomacy. With India and China appearing to prepare for the long-haul by sending in reinforcements - both sides, fortunately, remain with their guns pointed down - Indian officials have said flag-meetings had "lost their relevance" leaving a stalemate, with hopes pinned on a political solution.
On the positive side, engagement continues, including at the highest levels. On July 7, Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping had a five-minute conversation in Hamburg, on the sidelines of an informal BRICS leaders' meeting at the G20.
The MEA said the conversation touched a "a range of issues". In keeping with the post-1988 consensus that the border shouldn't hold the rest of the relationship hostage, the PM gave the green light for no less than four ministers to travel to China on July 6 for various BRICS ministerial meetings.
India has certainly handled the stand-off soberly, with only one statement from the MEA on June 30. "When such situations arise," Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar said in a July 11 speech in Singapore, "I see no reason, when having handled so many situations in the past, we would not be able to handle it".
However, the worry in this instance is that an increasingly confident - some might say belligerent - China has shown no mood for compromise, and instead stoked the fires of nationalism at home. As in its disputes in the South China Sea, where Beijing similarly unilaterally altered the status quo on disputed islands, China is arguing there was no dispute in Doklam to begin with.
Moreover, in Beijing's view, this incident is of a completely different nature from past stand-offs with India because it is not on territory disputed between India and China, but land disputed by Bhutan and China.
China has hence demanded an unconditional withdrawal. "If the Indian troops are preparing for the long term with no intention to leave, then how can there be room for diplomatic solutions?" said foreign ministry spokesperson Geng Shuang on July 10. "India should immediately withdraw its people without any condition," he said. "That comes before any substantial dialogue."
And in stark contrast with India's sober public statements, the State media have come out with almost daily threats, on everything from intervening in Jammu & Kashmir to questioning the status of Sikkim, although this should be taken with a few large tubs of salt and seen more as nationalist posturing than reflecting any policy change from the government.
This public posturing, officials say, follows a template Beijing has used recently to pressure Japan and the Philippines over their disputes. For Beijing, escalation could be a dangerous game. With a key once-in-five-year party congress in October, Xi can neither afford to look weak at home nor, on the other hand, consider the risk of an embarrassment at the hands of India in one of the few areas along the border where China is at a considerable disadvantage.
Beijing is also keen to ensure that its hosting of the BRICS Summit in September shows Xi as a global statesman, for which it needs India's cooperation; hence its laying of the red carpet to Indian ministers in the midst of its verbal attacks. Yet the concern is unlike in the past, when both governments handled boundary incidents quietly and soberly, Beijing's shrill rhetoric may be narrowing the space for compromise.
India and China have since Rajiv Gandhi's 1988 visit largely succeeded in preserving a complex model of relations, based on shelving differences and preventing disputes from descending into discord. This has been achieved through a number of robust agreements, which have largely been followed faithfully with great effort, from a 1993 agreement on peace and tranquility - the first agreement on the border that committed both to a peaceful resolution - to a 1996 agreement on confidence building measures.
These were strengthened in 2003 through the special representatives' mechanism that not only negotiates on a resolution to the boundary question but has also emerged as an important platform for strategic consultations. The agreements were reinforced with a 2013 border defence cooperation agreement.
This carefully preserved architecture now appears to be showing signs of stress, and it appears might require reinforcement. China, in its other territorial disputes as well, has recently begun to approach them with a new assertiveness, eschewing quiet diplomacy for public campaigns that stoke nationalism at home. The Doklam incident has perhaps served a warning of a new and uncompromising Chinese approach that may well have changed the rules of the game.