Pakistan can't blame India or US for its failures in Afghanistan
The increasing trust deficit between Kabul and Islamabad (read Rawalpindi) has been more pronounced in recent times. Afghan President Ashraf Ghani's address to the United Nations General Assembly was clearly directed towards Pakistan, compelling the neighbouring country to take recourse to the "right to respond". He made similar comments during his recent visit to India.
India and Afghanistan signed, among a slew of agreements, one for training the Afghan police in India. New Delhi is already involved in training the Afghan army, and providing it military equipment and economic aid. No member of the Afghan government has ever said a kind word for Pakistan. In their view, Pakistan is a terror-supporting nation.
The Afghan leadership has been buoyed by the direct warning given to Pakistan by US President Donald Trump on curbing terror groups. Its reinforcement by US defence secretary Jim Mattis — who said that the US would be closely watching Pakistan's choices in the new Afghan policy — only added to the neighbouring country's woes.
Mattis' visit to Delhi, during which India agreed to participate in the development and training of Afghan security personnel, caused greater worry in Pakistan. Jim Mattis' statement to the senate committee that India turned down boots on the ground, solely due to considerations of Pakistan security, cut no ice.
As a counter, Pakistan prime minister Shahid Abbasi said that Pakistan would never accept any Indian role in Afghanistan.
His words, "We don't foresee any political or military role for India in Afghanistan. I think it will just complicate the situation and it will not resolve anything," clearly reflect the thoughts of the deep state. His other comments reflected the perception that Afghanistan and Kashmir are linked, as a resolution on Kashmir would bring peace to the region. There was a similar echo when the Pakistan foreign minister met the US secretary of state recently.
In this melee and worry, the Pakistan army chief rushed to Kabul last week with offers of training for Afghan army and police, aiming to counter the growing Indian influence. He was also seeking to identify common measures to enhance security cooperation, including joint operations, against terror groups.
Both nations have accused each other of supporting terror groups. Pakistan accuses Afghanistan (along with India) of permitting the existence of the Islamic State, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Jamaat-ul-Ahrar and Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA). Kabul claims Pakistan supports Taliban and the Haqqani network.
Pakistan feels that it is being singled out by Trump and Mattis due to US' failure in Afghanistan. Pakistan foreign minister, Khawaja Asif, said that it alone cannot take responsibility for Afghanistan's peace and security, nor would it permit the Afghan battle to be fought on its soil. At the same time, he admitted that the Haqqani network was a liability, but the country lacked assets to tackle it.
The BLA and the TTP, both based in the mountains of Afghanistan, often cross the Durand Line, which remains unrecognised by Afghanistan, to target minorities and security personnel in the western provinces. Pakistan claims that these are supported by India and the Afghan intelligence agencies. With Indian presence and involvement only likely to increase in Afghanistan, the worry in Pakistan is rising.
It has never reconsidered its flawed Afghan policy, nor even attempted to rectify it; instead, Pakistan has been blaming Afghanistan, India and the US for its ills and sufferings. Pakistan's approach towards its western neighbour should have been more friendly and cooperative, especially since the US walked in post 9/11. Had it cooperated, India would have been kept at arm's-length, the Durand Line issue would have been nearing resolution and anti-Pakistan terror groups could have been struggling to survive.
With Pervez Musharraf in the driver's seat, Pakistan felt that it could control the future of Afghanistan and make the state subservient. Therefore, it continued to support terror groups operating in Afghanistan without any long-term analysis. It provided sanctuary to Bin Laden and the Taliban leaders, only seeking to continue to exercise control over them. With the passage of time and regular change in the Taliban leadership, the group began creating its own identity and source of funding through production and distribution of opium. This made Pakistan's material support needless. Thus, they became liabilities, which Pakistan is now unable to handle.
Had Pakistan handled Afghanistan with positivity, the return of Afghan refugees into their nation would have been easier. It took the difficult path, left the nation in turmoil and, hence, prevented their return. It remains burdened with them and would, in time, have to accept them as Pakistan nationals as even the second generation has grown up and settled in the country.
Its flawed approach towards a fledging state, after NATO intervention, only opened doors for India to get in. Once India got a foothold, it went ahead seeking to further consolidate its base. Its developmental projects have earned it goodwill among the masses and provided it a free run within the country. Attacks on Indian consulates have only enhanced hatred towards Pakistan and sympathy for India.
Training their army and police personnel exposes Afghans to India's soft power, its freedom and ethics, making them strong allies. This would further alienate them from Pakistan. In fledgling democracies, where the elected governments are ineffective and terrorism is a daily battle, the army has a strong foothold, as it possesses the power to hold the nation together. The same holds true for Afghanistan too. An alienated Afghan army would never accept any goodwill from Pakistan.
No inputs flowed from either side on the outcome of the visit of their army chiefs. This proves, probably, that no significant breakthrough was made. The only result was a panicky seven-hour conference of the army chief with his corps commanders.
Pakistan is treading on slippery ground, solely because of its own flawed policies. It needs to change tack, but cannot as those it needs to control are beyond its influence. It may beg for time or seek to deflect the blame, but would never be able to make meaningful changes.
Hence, it would only face international ire and deeper isolation in the days ahead.