Why J&K Police is becoming a target of Kashmir’s militancy
On June 8, 2016, Hizbul Mujahideen (HM) commander and the poster boy of "new wave of militancy" Burhan Wani while justifying the killing of two policemen in south Kashmir, who he felt were working against militants, issued a warning to state police personnel not to fight against militants.
Prior to Burhan’s statement, many people took to social media condemning killing of the duo in south Kashmir and three others in central Kashmir, who were killed by militants a week prior to this attack. It is believed that at both the places, the deceased policemen were regulating traffic movement. All of them earned public sympathies - at least from certain sections of society.
On May 23, 2016, at his father’s funeral, Ishfaq Nazir, 25, son of head constable Nazir Ahmad Mir asked militants to give him one reason why his father was killed. "He was innocent and pro-people," he told local news agency CNS.
While Burhan’s message somehow answered Ishfaq's question, however, the big question remains why are policemen becoming target of militants, despite the fact that majority of them are not working as counter-insurgents.
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| Hizbul Mujahideen commander and the poster boy of Kashmir's "new wave of militancy" Burhan Wani. |
Anti-militancy activities and the atrocities commited by the police on people is seen as the reason of these attacks - be it in Tral, native place of Burhan, or in Karimabad, native village of former policeman-turned-militant and close aide of Burhan, Naseer Pandit.
Pandit was killed in an encounter with government forces. His funeral was attended by more than one lakh people. The slain ex-cop’s father believes that the attacks on policemen are justified, because they have been committing atrocities on people.
His argument was supported by a local teacher, who said that he had been used as human shield by police when they were searching for militants in his native village. However, when asked what was Naseer’s take on this, as he was himself a policeman, he said that Naseer had sympathy for policemen.
He said, "Ipso facto he [Naseer] became a militant after being subjected to torture by a head constable in Pulwama police station, while fighting a case against the drug mafia, who according to Pandit were working in league with police.
After his release, he headed to Srinagar instead of going home. Naseer decamped with a service rifle to join militant ranks. There are many good policemen who had sympathy for Naseer and who are not committing atrocities, but there are others who fight militancy. It is due to the latter that the former are bearing the brunt. Militants have no choice but to target them," the teacher added.
Naseer Pandit was a cop and could have been the target of militants just as so many have become of late. But then all policemen on the streets were not the target of militants.
Naseer was not the first cop to become a militant. Since 2010, seven policemen have joined militant ranks in Jammu and Kashmir, the government said on June 21, 2016.
While three of them, including Naseer, have been killed in encounters, three more have been detained, and one is still at large.
Prominent among them is Abdul Rashid Shigan, a police officer, who according to his department was involved in many high-profile killings. He was alleged to have played a role in target killings and most of his targets were politicians from mainstream parties, policemen working against militancy and suspected informers etc.
Former governor of J&K SK Sinha in a speech at Aligarh in 2012 went to the extent of saying that half the police force was militant sympathisers. Interestingly, this belief is prevalent among a larger section. More than 100 police personals are facing charges.
In the intervening period from 1990 to 1993, hundreds of policemen went on strike against the state for giving a free hand to the military. Also, post-1990, many joined police forces to save themselves from the wrath of military crackdowns - siege and identification parade to flush out militants.
Since when did police become target of militants?
Police as a counter-insurgency force came into existence when STF (Special Task Force) was formalised in 1996, though a special cell of police was actively involved in the anti-militancy operations even prior to it.
The force consisted of police officials who volunteered to work, especially people from Jammu, parts of Poonch, and some surrendered militants - locally known as Ikhwanis.
Since the days of its inception, STF was accused of killing, raping, torturing innocents and creating a wave of fear among the masses. The atrocities committed by the special force were reported by local, national and international media. Even Amnesty International filed a report on the miserable condition of prisoners who were subjected to third-degree torture inside "Cargo" - one of the infamous interrogation centers in Srinagar. People still get goosebumps while passing by this centre.
When Mufti Mohammad Sayeed came to power in 2002, he took many populist measures presumed to ease the sufferings of people; disbanding STF was one of them. Mufti convinced the central government that STF had become notorious in the state and it was high time to assimilate them in police stations rather than concentrating in camps.
He believed it will work in two ways: one that it will be seen as a populist decision, and two, that due to the presence of erstwhile STF personnel in police stations, the entire unit will get involved in counter-insurgency operations. The announcement came as a big sigh of relief to the entire population, especially in the peripheral regions of Valley.
This was a turning point in the state’s counter-insurgency strategy. The STF was not totally disbanded. All the SHOs were directed to participate actively in anti-militancy operations. District SPs were directed to eliminate militants in their respective areas.
Thus, a force meant for prevention and detection of crime and maintenance of law and order was turned into a full-fledged counter-insurgency force.
In comparison to a selected few hundred in the STF, now, a force with a strength of more than one lakh was organised to fight militants. This was not just a fight between two armed forces, but a Kashmiri was pitched against a Kashmiri and a neighbour against neighbour, each playing a different role.
State’s "iron kills iron" policy was at work. Over the years, police department recruited more people. The recruitment was not just done to increase its base but it was also aimed at "mainstreaming" the “radicals”.
For example, soon after the 2010 protests in Kashmir, police organised a special recruitment drive in downtown area to streamline the stone-pelters - young boys who use stones as weapons of resistance to fight state forces. Likewise, many on–the-spot recruitment programs were organised in many districts, especially in volatile areas.
After partially disbanding the STF, it's erstwhile officers who had been promoted from constables to inspectors as a reward for the work against militancy, were posted as SHOs in various police stations.
These officials came with their own SOPs and outlook. They were mentally prepared to implement the home minister's policy of combating militancy through police. Combating operations became a lucrative job on many accounts - it fetched medals, money and out of turn promotions.
Police officials, including SHOs were given source fund; rewards for killing and possible departmental promotion up to the rank of deputy SP etc. Many SHOs were not only working to follow orders but were convinced to work against militancy for perks. This directly pitched police against the militants.
What followed was the cascade of events. Most of the anti-militancy operations, especially in urban areas, were conducted by the police with the support of Army and paramilitary forces.
Police came to the forefront. Lock-ups were no longer meant for criminals, militants were locked there too. Police became the target of militants irrespective of rank and file. For them, everyone donning the uniform was a combatant.
During the protests of 2008, 2009 and 2010, police was in direct confrontation with the tens of thousands of protestors all over the Valley, and in some parts of Chenab Valley. In all these protests, hundreds of people died, innumerable received minor and major injuries, and thousands were jailed - and the hatred against police only grew.
The 25 years of turmoil have consumed more than one lakh lives, including 6,000-plus police personnel who died in anti-militancy related activities and target killings, especially in the last couple of years.
While policemen were targeted before the year 2000 as well, the people eliminated were mostly the ones with a track record of having worked directly or indirectly against militancy. Since militancy was at its peak, the causalities were ought to be high.
Of late there has been a paradigm shift on the attacks on policemen. In recent killings, which include an incident in Qazigund, on January 12, militants attacked policemen travelling in a taxi, who locals say, have no track record of counter-insurgency.
As the state gives police credit for bringing the "situation" under control, what becomes evident is that for militants, every policeman on the road represents the state.
Death of policemen at the hand of militants may suit the state apparatus as it pitches Kashmiris against each other, but in the long run, it is the state's defeat.
Police might be well equipped to deal with militancy. Caught between the devil and the deep sea, they are in a dilemma, and hence, are unable to strike the balance between societal pressures and professional responsibilities.
In the ensuing process, however, they have forgotten basic policing. A handful of police officers are equipped to deal with civil and criminal cases. The FIRs produced in the courts are so unconvincing that even dreaded criminals get away scott-free. Protests for water and electricity restoration are dealt in a manner as if they are anti-state or pro-azadi.
The police is primarily responsible for maintaining public order, prevention and detection of crimes. In a society where it fails to deliver its basic duty, people would live in the Hobbesian state of nature in which life would lose its value.