Lessons to learn from past floods

The ongoing rescue and relief operations in the flood affected regions of Jammu and Kashmir reminds the nation yet again of the absence of strategic wisdom and strategy in the prevention, mitigation and coping strategy for dealing with the disasters. But more importantly, the narrative reinforces the nation's belief in the military, as the saviour of its people irrespective of the adversary - be it the physical enemy or weather. There are several common aspects to the calamities that struck Uttarakhand last year and the one that is prevailing in Kashmir as of now. Both are Himalayan States; the rain in both was of unprecedented ferocity; unabated fury, persisted over a prolonged period. In both, neither the local authorities, nor the affected population, had any clue or inkling whatsoever of heavy rainfall, which was likely to occur. They neither knew, what may be required of them mentally, logistically or the where-withal that may be needed by them or by the society, to face the arising situation. "It is not my responsibility, but that of somebody else" seems to have dominated the mindset. The issue of ownership of dealing with the crises remained obfuscated, and responsibility, outsourced. In both, the vagaries of climate and terrain severely impacted and delayed rescue and relief efforts.

Reality

There are however some differences. J&K rains, occurred over one year after Uttarakhand and that makes adequate time available between the two, to enable lessons to be learnt for better prevention or mitigation, particularly in our Himalayan states. Since the lessons were not learnt, citizens have paid a huge price and relief and rescue operations continue to this day. There were no guns with the rescue workers while dealing with those in distress in Uttarakhand, which in J&K, may not be the case. Unlike Uttarakhand, where the grid had to be established for relief and rescue, the security grid and mosaic in this case exist and this grid for security could be leveraged for safety as the two are synonymous. Building last mile connectivity to the people in distress was the first priority in Uttarakhand and amongst the most critical 'must do task' which was completed in 72 hours notwithstanding the ordeal, however this continues to be a work in progress, so far as current rescue operations in J&K is concerned. Relief operations of such a magnitude which is a multi-agency process, may get coordinated through committees at strategic level, require effective leadership at the executive level of the State, with a clear and concise concept of operations. The concept defines a holistic, systems approach and drives all stake holders through empowerment with a common vision and mission towards the established goals and objectives of relief and rehabilitation which have to be reinforcing and complementing. It enables planners to position resources and logistics for the smooth flow for the next phase of operations, for its timely execution. In the current situation, the first as well as the second responders have been hit. The responders, i.e. district and the State Administration are themselves, engaged in self recovery and it goes to the credit of the security forces that they are managing a diffused , confused ,complex and ambiguous situation most boldly, amidst a very high level of anxiety with no certainty of what lies in future. Such situations ordinarily demand a set of planners to do their work dexterously behind the scene to shape the future for a better cohesive and coordinated response to the evolving situations.

Functional

Absence of functional NDMA structure appears to have worsened the situation but the aspect of seamless coordination between the Central and State Government are being managed well by institutionalised bodies such as crisis Management Committee. The issue left is then of implementation at functional level i.e. executive level of state, which needs coordination, cooperation and communication through unity of command for producing desired effects instead of fragmented approach. This was missing in Uttarakhand and so is the case in J&K. While responsibility may be outsourced accountability cannot and for it, we need functional structures at multiple levels to coordinate, society's response to the crisis.

Calamity

It is also the view, drawn from experience that 'relief' in calamity goes beyond mere physical and material support. There are the dimensions of psychological and administrative support which need to be addressed. A responder's role does not cease with 'saving lives'. The response agency, as the Armed Forces in Uttarakhand for a long time, was the only ones to who, the affected population looked up as saviours at a time of severe mental trauma. Their presence also ensured social order being maintained and notwithstanding their administrative authorisation, they effectively represented the State and in the absence of any 'legitimate' authority, maintained law and order. After they left, the administration tried to get back but it succeeded at great cost and pain. This is more applicable in the context of J&K where the weather window will close shortly on account of approaching winter and our countrymen through delayed last mile connectivity, may be left without much of an option for reconstructing their lives. Responsibility should be entrusted to those who can really do it and do it, urgently.