Sukma massacre: Tough questions we need to ask
The killing of 25 CRPF personnel by Maoists in the Burkapal-Chintagufa forests of Sukma district in Chattisgarh should lay to rest claims by various government agencies that left-wing extremism (LWE), especially in Chattisgarh, was on the wane. The attack has taken the toll on the side of the forces to 49, much more than the 36 reported in 2016.
In March earlier this year, 12 CRPF personnel were killed in Bhejji in Sukma district. The April 24 attack is the deadliest attack on security forces this year. The political response to the attack was on expected lines. While the prime minister, home minister and Chattisgarh chief minister described the attack as "cowardly", "deplorable" and "we shall not relent in our fight", Opposition leaders demanded the resignation of the Chattisgarh CM for failing to check the spread of LWE in the state.
Lost in the allegations, counter-allegations and the cacophony of TV anchors baying for blood with the "cut me loose - I’ll deal with them" responses is the much needed analysis on why are security forces taking so many hits?
There are tough questions that need to be asked even if it is at a time when families are grieving — in fact all the more reason they should be asked now.
The CRPF presence on the day at the ambush site was company strength or about 100 troopers. Though no official accounts are coming forward, CRPF personnel who returned from the site said they were attacked by about 300 Maoists.
The attacking party had superiority of numbers but one must remember they were attacking a trained professional force that was aware of the area it was in and hence should have been aware of the threats it offered in terms of topography.
The CRPF personnel were armed with automatic weapons, equipped with under barrel grenade launchers and had gone as part of a support group to a road construction site where such attacks have taken place in the past. Claiming they were "surprised" doesn’t add up to much.
The attack on Monday also followed the same narrative heard over and over again: that the forces too inflicted heavy casualties on the Maoists but their bodies were taken away. This was the narrative in Sukma in March, as also in Dantewada in 2010 when 76 troopers were killed and in Jeeram Ghati when 25 people including police and top Congress leaders were killed. Unfortunately, the security forces do not have any evidence to support their claims.
While it is accepted that in an ambush the attacking party has a definite advantage, there are SOPs laid down for the defending side to react in such situations so that the casualties are minimised. Are the SOPs not being followed?
Ambush has emerged as the most successful Maoist strategy while targeting security forces. Nobody can predict how an ambush will pan out but training is meant to precisely address this gap. Is the training not as effective? Also, why does it take hours for reinforcements to arrive — especially when choppers are on standby for forces in Bastar?
Importantly, forces are under tremendous pressure to respond to the attack. Mistakes in the form of excesses on the local population and badly planned operations resulting in more casualties on the forces’ side take place precisely at such times. These are issues the CRPF and even the state police need to look into immediately.
Having a full-time head of the CRPF may also help - since critical decisions will have to be taken at that level.
After all, lives are being lost when they could easily have been saved.
(Courtesy of Mail Today.)
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