India-Pakistan 1971 war: Insulting Army is wrong
Garga Chatterjee in his article titled "Indian Army's Misleading Tweet About 1971 War Adds to a Culture of Jingoistic Misinformation, Puts Bangladesh Government in a Tight Spot", presents a lopsided view of the 1971 war victory. The article, published in Firstpost on December 17, is based on a few tweets - that were subsequently removed - from the Indian Army's public information department's (ADGPI) Twitter handle and incorrect information. The author clearly lacks knowledge of military operations.
A few facts about the war need to be clarified for the information of Garga. The war was fought jointly by the Indian armed forces and the Mukti Jodhas (Bangladeh's freedom fighters). The overall control remained with the Eastern Command of the Indian Army. The Multi Jodhas were not an independent force operating on their own but were recruited, trained and equipped by Indian forces. Most former Mukti Jodha members, who attend Vijay Diwas celebrations in Kolkata, fondly remember Indian Army officers, who trained them. There is immense mutual respect among the soldiers who fought together.
Garga has distorted facts and even failed to read the account given by Lt Gen JFR Jacob, the man sent by India to Dacca, to have the surrender negotiated and signed. Garga also has no inkling of inputs from Mukti Jodhas, hence makes irresponsible comments in his article on the surrender ceremony. The final surrender document was signed by Lt Gen AAK Niazi, the commander of the Pakistan Army in erstwhile East Pakistan, and Lt Gen JS Aurora, the eastern Army commander.
The surrender happened before the Indian Army and in full public view at the Dacca Race Course. Niazi handed over his epaulette and revolver to Aurora and his troops followed across Bangladesh surrendering to the nearest Indian Army post. The reason for surrender to the Indian Army was to ensure the safety and security of the Pakistan forces. Also, Pakistan had to surrender to a legal military force, not irregular troops comprising Mukti Jodhas. Members of the Mukti Jodha were also present in Dacca when the surrender ceremony took place and wanted to hang Niazi and his soldiers, which was prevented because they were being provided protection by the Indian Army.
Another reality missed by Garga is that Niazi agreed to surrender on the ground that he and his forces are ensured protection by Indian forces. Hence, they were immediately moved to prisoner war camps in India. The wording of the surrender document mentioning joint forces had a political reason. India wanted to prove to the world that it was acting in support of the Mukti Jodhas and was not the aggressor. Jacob mentions in his interviews that independent Mukti Jodha operations ceased on November 30, 1971, while the war commenced on December 3.
There is no doubt that Mukti Jodhas played an important role in the war. They were locals with immense knowledge of the terrain and hence could guide advancing Indian forces and also provide other crucial and relevant information. All major assaults were launched by the Indian Army. Ambushes and covert operations to destroy communication centres were the responsibility of the Mukti Jodhas, thus clearly joint operations, under the command of Indian forces.
Garga also has no knowledge of how military operations were conducted during the 1971 War nor has he bothered to understand the basics of warfare. All forces operating in a war, fight under one commander and not independently. The commander responsible for operations in one sector sub-allocates resources to subordinate commanders for carrying out targeted missions. Thus, Mukti Jodha units were functioning under the command of subordinate formations that fell directly under the Eastern Command.
Driven by his possible dislike for the Indian Army, Garga went on to say that Indian forces alone never defeated the Pakistan Army but jointly with the Mukti Jodhas. The Mukti Jodhas fought under the command of the Indian Army, not as an independent force, hence it was the Indian armed forces, of which the Mukti Jodhas was a part, which won the war. The Mukti Jodhas were only involved on the eastern front, whereas the Indian armed forces fought on both fronts.
Bangladesh is well aware of the facts of the involvement of the Indian Army, and does not require Garga's "Hindu vs Muslim" narrative on the war.
Mukti Jodha soldiers only saw the Indian intervention as support from a neighbouring country to save them from the genocide being carried out by Pakistan. They never viewed it from a religious angle.
Soldiers respect fellow soldiers, without taking into account their religion, when they fight alongside. Therefore, Vijay Diwas is an occasion to celebrate victory, obtained through immense sacrifices made by the Indian Army and members of Mukti Jodha fighting a common enemy. Veterans on both sides meet warmly and bond as soldiers, which armchair critics would never be able to understand.
Bangladesh was never meant to join the Indian union, as Garga wrongly says, it was envisaged to be an independent nation. Hence even the surrender document mentioned the word Bangladesh. For India, it will no longer be Pakistan and an additional frontier for the Army to guard. This can be understood from the fact that the responsibility of securing the border with Bangladesh is with the Border Security Force and not the army, as was the case before 1971.
The Indian Army suffered over 1,400 casualties and more than 4,000 of its soldiers were left wounded, which would not have been possible had it not fought actively. It is easy to criticise when you know there would be no rebuttal. Views change when you wear a uniform and face bullets. Garga's views would also change if he steps down from his pedestal and meets wounded veterans and war widows, who are victims of the 1971 war.
Garga must know, the Indian Army never lies to its people. It always shares the truth as it has nothing to hide. Only those who bear a grudge against it find faults where none exist.